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ABSTRACT
Objective measures of performance are seldom perfect. Inresponse, incentive contracts
often include importantsubjectivecomponents that mitigate incentive distortions caused by
imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combineduseof subjective and objective
performance measures in (respectively) implicit and explicit incentivecontraôts.
Naturally, objective and subjective measures often are substitutes,sometimes strikingly
so: we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close toperfect then no implicit contracts
are feasible (because the rum's failback position afterreneging on an implicit contact is too
attractive). We also show, however, that objective andsubjective measures can reinforce each
other: if objective measures become moreaccnrate then in some circumstances the optimal
contract puts more weight on subjective measures (because theimproved objective measures
increase the value of the ongoing relationship, andso reduce the firm's incentive to renege). We
also analyze the use of subjective weights on objectiveperformance measures, and provide case-
study evidence consistent with our analyses.
George Baker Kevin J. Murphy
Harvard Business School Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field Road Soldiers Field Road
Boston, MA 02163 Boston, MA 02163
Robert S. Gibbons




and NBERSubjective Performance Measures in OptimalIncentive Contracts
by
GeorgeBaker, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy
1. Introduction
IA. Motivation
Businesshistory is littered with firms that got whatthey paidfor. At the H.J. Heinz
Company, for example, division managers received bonuses only ifearnings increased from
the prior year. The managers delivered consistentearnings growth by manipulating the
timing of shipments to customers and by prepaying for services notyet received) At Dun &
Bradsireet, salespeople earned no commission unless thecustomer bought a larger
subscription to the finn's credit-report services than in the previousyear. In 1989, the
company faced millions of dollars in lawsuits following charges that its salespeople deceived
customers into buying larger subscriptions by fraudulentlyoverstating their historical usage.2
In 1992, Sears abolished the commission plan in itsauto-repair shops, which paid mechanics
based on the profits from repairs authorized by customers. Mechanicsmisled customers into
authorizing unnecessary repairs, leading California officials toprepare to close Sears' auto-
repair business statewide.3
In each of these cases, employees took actions to increase theircompensation, but
these actions were seemingly at the expense of long-run firm value. AtHeinz, for example,
prepaying for future services greatly reduced the firm's future flexibility, but the
compensation system failed to address this issue. Similarly, at Dun & Bradstreet and Sears,
although short-run profits increased with the increases in subscription sizes and autorepairs,
the long-run harm done to the firms' reputations was significant(and plausibly much larger
than the short-run benefit), but the compensationsystem again ignored the issue. Thus, in
each of these cases, the cause of any dysfunctional behaviorwas not pay-for-performance
perse, butrather pay-for-performance based on an inappropriate performancemeasure.
Post, Richard 3. and Kenneth B. Goodpaster, "HI. Heinz Company: The Administration ofPolicy," liES Case #382.034.
2Roberts, Johnnie L., "Credit Squeeze: Dun&BradstreetFacesFlap Over How It Sells Reports on
Businesses," Walt Street Journal, March 2,1989.
Patterson, Gregory, "Distressed Shoppers, Disaffected Workers Prompt Stores to Alter Sales
Commission," Watt Street Journal, June 1, 1992.2
Many firms mitigate the effects of distortionaiy objective performance measures by
augmenting objective measures with subjective assessments of performance. Investment
bankers involved in corporate fmance, for example, could be measured by several objective
performance measures, such as fees generated. Nonetheless, most investment banks devote
significant resources to subjectively assessing other factors such as the "quality of the deals,
the bankers' contributions to customer satisfaction, training ofyounger associates, and
marketing" (Eccles and Crane, 1988, p. 166). Even in the sales and trading function of an
investment bank, where more accurate objective aspects of an individual's contribution to
firm value are easily measured on a daily basis, banks again deliver a significant amount of a
trader's compensation through a subjectively determined bonus (Eccles and Crane,p. 170).
Lincoln Electric, the dominant manufacturer of arc welding equipment, provides
another example of the combined use of objective performance measurement and subjective
performance assessment. Since its founding in 1895, the firm has continuously reduced
costs and increased quality; it drove General Electric from the arc-welder market and reduced
Westinghouse to a bit player. Lincoln has been called "the holy shrine of incentive pay"
(Perry, 1988, p.51), in part because the firm creates strong incentives through piece-ratepay
based on objective performance measures. A second element of Lincoln'scompensation
package also creates strong incentives, however in a typical year, half a worker'spay comes
from a bonus based on management's assessment of the worker'scooperation, innovation,
dependability, and other subjective aspects of performance.
18. Analytical Framework
An ideal performance measure would reflect an employee's contributionto firm
value, including both static externalities across business units and dynamic effects ofcurrent
actions on long-run value. Basing pay on an employee's contribution to firm value would
have prevented the seemingly dysfunctional behaviors at Heinz, Dun &Bradsireet, and
Sears. Unfortunately, for most employees, contribution to firm value isnot objectively
measurable: market-adjusted stock-price performancemay be a useful measure of a CEO's
contribution but typically is an extremely noisy measure of the contributions of lower-level
employees.
When an employee's contribution to firm value is not objectivelymeasurable, it often
can be subjectively assessed by managers or supervisors who are well placed to observe the
subtleties of the employee's behavior and opportunities. Even if suchsubjective assessments
of an employee's contribution to finn valueare imperfect, they may complement or improve
on the available objective measures. Thus, an implicit contract basedon subjective3
performance assessments may augment or replace an explicit contract based on objective
performance measurements.
While an explicit contract can be enforced by a court, an implicit contractcannot, and
so is vulnerable to reneging by the firm. Numerous observers of organizational pay practices
have noted that trust between workers and supervisors is essential if subjective performance
assessment systems are to be successful (Lawler, 1971; Hamner, 1975). We formalize (part
of) the notion of mist in performance evaluation by requir-ing that implicit contracts based on
subjective performance assessments be enforced not by the courts but by the firm's concern
for its reputation in the labor market (HolmstrOm, 1981; Bull, 1987). Thus, an implicit
contract could also be called a self-enforcing contract.
In this paper, we assume that the only objective measure of performance is imperfect,
so when used alone it causes the worker to take suboptimal actions. We develop two models
of subjective performance assessment. In our first analysis, the firm and the worker observe
a subjective assessment of performance in addition to the imperfect objective measure.
Naturally, such objective and subjective measures often are substitutes, sometimes strikingly
so: we show that if the objective measure is sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit
contract is feasible (because the firm's fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract
is too attractive). We also show, however, that objective and subjective measures can
reinforce each other: if the objective measure becomes more accurate then in some
circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on the subjective measure (because the
improved objective measure increases the value of the ongoing relationship, and so reduces
the firm's incentive to renege).
This first analysis yields three comparative-static predictions. First, if the value of the
ongoing relationship between the firm and the worker falls, the implicit contracts the firm can
sustain will be less effective, so the incentives provided by implicit contacts will decrease,
and those provided by explicit contracts will increase. Second, if objective performance
measures become more accurate (such as after a division is spun off from a conglomerate),
the incentives provided by implicit contracts decrease if the faliback contract is sufficiently
attractive but increase otherwise. Third, if it becomes more difficult for the firm to produce
accurat subjective performance assessments (such as after expansion or diversification of the
firm's operations), the incentives osded by implicit and explicit contracts will decrease and
increase, respectively. We provide case-study evidence consistent with these predictions.
In our second analysis we assume that the firm can subjectively evaluate the incentive
distortions caused by the imperfect objective performance measure. In this case, the optimal
incentive contract attaches a subjective weight (or a subjective piece-rate) to the objective
performance measure, to "back out" or moderate the distortions that would be created by the4
optimal explicit contract We show that the contract between the worker and the firm is left
deliberately vague: although there is an explicit understanding of how performance is
measured, there is only an implicit understanding regarding how that objective performance
measure is rewarded. The optimal incentive contract combines both objective and subjective
weights on the objective performance measure, because increasing the objective weight
reduces the employer's incentive to renege on large payoffs prescribed by the subjective
weight. We provide case-study evidence of the use of such subjective weights on objective
performance measures.
IC. Outline
Our analyses integrate and extend two benchmark models from the literature—one
concerning implicit contracts and another concerning explicit contracts. In Section 2 we
develop our model and analyze these two benchmarks: in Section 2A we describe the
economic environment for our model (i.e., the information structure, preferences, production
and contracting possibilities, and chronology of events), and in Sections 2B and 2C we
present the two benchmark models.
The first benchmark is Baker's (1992) model of an explicit contract. Unlike agency
models such as Holmstrom's (1979), Baker assumes that the worker's conthbution to firm
value is too complex and subtle to be objectively measured, and so cannot be the basis of an
enforceable contract Any explicit contract therefore must be based on an imperfect objective
measure of the worker's contribution—such as the quantity but not the quality of a worker's
output—but using such a measure causes workers to take suboptimal actions.4 Naturally,
the slope of the optimal explicit contract falls as the distortions in the objective performance
measure increase.
The second benchmark is a repeated-game model of an implicit contract, much like
Bull's (1987). The firm would like the worker to be cooperative, innovative, and
dependable, and offers to pay the worker a bonus based on these subjective aspects of
performance. If the firm has no concern for its reputation, its incentive is to claim that the
worker performed poorly and so deserves no bonus. If the firm values its reputation,
however, it must weigh the temptation to stiff the worker today against the present value of
the benefits from future cooperation, innovation, and dependability, and the costs of future
bonuses. The optimal subjective bonus plan is self-enforcing: the bonus must be sufficiently
small that the firm has no incentive to renege. If the firm's discount rate is sufficiently low
then the present value of being trustworthy is large enough that animplicit contract can
"Flolinstromand Milgrom's (1991) model is similar in spirit to Baker's. An analogous analysis of
implicit and explicit contracts could be built on their model rather than Baker's.5
achieve the first-best outcome; otherwise, the best feasible implicit contract requires a smaller
bonus and so produces second-best incentives.
In Section 3 we combine the benchmark models from Sections 2B and 2(2 to analyze
the optimal interplay between subjective performance assessments and objective performance
measures in implicit and explicit contracts. In each period, part of compensation is an explicit
contract based on the objective measurement of an imperfect proxy for the worker's
contribution, and part is a bonus based on a subjective assessment of the worker's
contribution to firm value. In the latter part of this section, we relax our assumption that the
subjective assessment is noncontractible but otherwise perfect; our qualitative results extend
to such imperfect subjective assessments.
In Section 4 we explore the use of subjective weights on imperfect objective
performance measures. Here we assume that, after the worker's performance has been
observed, the employer or supervisor can subjectively assess the distortions caused by the
objective performance measure. (In practice, such ex post judgments seem likely to be
inbomplete or imprecise, but in this exploratory analysis we assume they are perfect.)
Although the firm would like to use its subjective assessment to eliminate all the distortions in
the objective performance measure, it faces the same reputation problem as in Section 3—the
firm cannot credibly commit to very high subjectively determined payoffs. We explore the
tradeoff between objective and subjective piece rates on objective performance measures:
increasing the objective piece rate reduces the employer's incentive to renege on high total
payoffs (by reducing the subjective portion of the high payoff), but typically also provides
excessive incentives in some states of the world.
In Section 5 we present case-study evidence consistent with our analyses. We offer
the cases as independently gathered qualitative observations of organizational practices
consistent with not only the predictions but also the underlying causal mechanisms of our
models. In presenting each case, we use our models to organize the welter of case facts into
a logically consistent and intuitive analysis.
Finally, in Section 6 we discuss three potential extensions of our analysis: supervisor
bias in subjective performance assessment, the use of multiple subjective evaluators, and the
interplay between explicit pay-for-performance contracts and implicit promotion contracts
(rather than the implicit pay-for-performance contracts we study here).6
2. Benchmark Models
2A. TheEconomicEnvironment
We consider a repeated game between a single firm and a single worker.5 In each
period, the worker chooses an unobservable action, a, that stochastically determines the
worker's contribution to r value, y. To keep things as simple as possible, we assume that
y equals either zero or one. It is then natural to define the worker's action to be the
probability that y =1:Prob{y =II a) =a,where a E[0,11. As discussed in the
Introduction, we assume that the worker's contribution to firm value is too complex and
subtle to be verified by a third party, and so cannot be the basis of an enforceable conUact
That is, y cannot be objectively measured. On the other hand, we assume thaty can be
subjectively assessed (as explained below).
The worker's action also affects a second performance measure,p. Like y, p equals
either zero or one (although any other pair of values would do as well, becausep is not
directly relevant to the parties' payoffs, as will become clear). Unlike y, however, p can be
objectively measured, and so can be the basis of an explicit contract
The objective performance measure p is an imperfectproxy for the worker's
contribution to firm value, in the following sense. Before choosing an action, the worker
receives private information (denoted by 11>0) about the difference between the effect of the
worker's action on y and its effect on p. The probability thatp =1is Wa (where we assume
that the support of it and the shape of the disutility function introduced beloware such that
•a c 1). For simplicity, we assume that given tanda, the events that y =1 and that p =
areindependent. We interpret it as follows: there are days (I.e. values of i)whenhigh
actions increase both y and p, days when high actions increasey but not p, and days when
small actions increase p but not y; these "days" correspond tog around one, j.tnearzero, and
x much larger than one, respectively. We assume that EQtF=1 so that, onaverage, the
performance measure p is an unbiased measure of condbutiony, but this normalization does
not affect our qualitative results.
Compensation contracts consist of a base salary, s, an implicit-contract bonus b paid
when the subjective assessment isy =I,and an explicit-contract bonus flpaidwhen the
objective measure isp =1.The worker's total compensation is therefore either s, s +b,s +
3, ors +b+. Thetiming of events within each period is as follows. First, the firm offers
The sngle worker we consider could just as well be an infinitequence of workers, eachofwhomlives
for one penod, provided that each period's worker learns thehistory of play before the period begins..7
the worker a compensation package (s, b, ).Second,the worker either accepts the
compensation package or rejects it in favor of an alternative employment opportunity with
payoff w8. Third, if the worker accepts then the worker observes j.tandthen chooses an
action a ￿ 0 at cost c(a). The firm does not observe g or the worker's action. Fourth, the
firm and the worker observe the realization of the worker's contribution, y, and the firm and
the worker (and, if necessary, a court) observe the realization of the objective performance
measure, p. Finally, if p =Ithen the firm pays the bonus pdictatedby the explicit contract,
and if y =1then the firm chooses whether to pay the worker the bonus b specified in the
implicit contract
The firm's payoff when the worker's contribution is y and total compensation is us y
-I.The firm's discount rate is r, in our analysis, the worker's discount rate is immaterial,
because it is the firm's reputation that is at stake. The worker's payoff from choosing an
action with cost c(a) and receiving total compensation Xis I -c(a).In order to compute
various closed-font solutions, we assume that c(a) =a2.The first-best action, which
equates the expected marginal product of effort with its marginal cost, therefore satisfies 1=
c'(a*), or a* =l/2y.
Given an implicit contract b and an explicit contract p. if the worker believes the firm
will honor the implicit contract then the worker's problem after observing a realization of jiis
(2.1) nl:.x s+ab+gaj3-ya2,
so the worker's optimal action is
(2.2) a'Qi, b, p)=
Sincethe first-best action is a* =1/2y,effort will be less than the first-best level whenever.
b÷c1.
Theworker will choose to work for the firm if his expected payoff (before observing
g) exceeds the alternative wage:
(2.3)E(s +a*Q.x,b, )•b +wa*Qt,b, p).p- .*Q.L, b,p)2) ￿ W.
Thefirm's expected profit per period, given an implicit contract b and an explicit contract
but before the worker observes the realization of iis
(2.4) E(a*(j.t, b, p)- Es+a*41,b, )•b +$j.a*Qj,b, >])8
Thefirm's optimal base salary s will be the lowest salary satisfying (2.3). Substituting this
salary into (2.4) yields the firm's expected profit per period as a function of the implicit
bonus b and the explicit piece-rate ,whichwe denote by V(b, ):
(2.5) V(b, )aEda*4t, b, )- a1(j.i, b,p)2 -w3}.
2B,An Explicit contract Based on an Objective Perfonnance Measure
In this sub-section we ignore implicit contracts based on the subjective performance
measure y, focusing instead on explicit contracts based on the imperfect proxy for the
worker'scontribution to firmvalue—the objective performance measure, p. Given an
explicit contract ,theworker's optimal action after observing the realization of j.s follows
from (2.2):
(2.6)a*4tj)=
The optimal contract again sets the salary s at the minimum value that satisfies (2.3), and now
sets to ma irnize the expected profit per period,
(2.7)
T1)(
E(a*(x, p)-1Qj P)2 - wa1.
Solvingthe first-order condition for (2.7), and recalling that E{l1)=1 and E(M2)=l+var4t),
implies that the optimal explicit-contract bonus is
(28) p*_.Ep{).t}— 1
We denote the resulting expected profit for the finn by V(p*):
(2.9) VQ3t) =4i[l+var4Q]
-wa.
The intuition behind this analysis is as follows. When the variance ofs is large, the
marginal product of the worker's action on p (namely, M) is a noisy reflection of the marginal
product of the worker's action on y (namely, one). Consider the effect of setting =Iwhen
the variance of j.t is large: the worker will choose the first-best action whenji =I,.but
otherwise a*Qj, 1) will vary wildly with p.. Given the convex cost function c(a)=ya2, the
worker's expected cost Eg{c[a*4L, 1)]) will be high, and the firm will have tocompensate
the worker for this expected cost in the salary defined by (23). The firm'soptimal response
is to offer a low value of ,therebysettling for weak incentives rather than strong but9
frequentlydysfunctional incentives. (Compare this prescription to the seemingly
dysfunctional incentive schemes at Heinz, Dun & Bradsireet, and Sears.) Since JP and VØ)
fall as the variance of s rises, we will say that the objective perfomiancemeasure p is 'note
distortionary when var4t) is higher.
2C. An Implicit Contract Based on a Subjective Petformance Assessment
To complement the previous sub-section, we now ignore explicit contracts basedon
the imperfect objective performance measure, focusing instead on the incentives thatimplicit
contracts can provide. Our analysis is much like Bull's, and also is similar in somerespects
to those of Becker and Stigler (1974) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). In the latter models,
however, incentives follow from the threat of terminating the relationship followingpoor
performance, whereas in our model incentives follow from pay-for-performance with no
threatoftennination. Fwthermore,inourmodelitisthefirmthathasaninccnuvetor.ge,
not the worker. The main connection between our model and the Becker-Stigler and
Shapim-Stiglitz models is the role of the present value of the ongoing relationship in keeping
one of the players honest
The incentives provided by the implicit contract (s, b) depend on whether the worker
"trusts" the firm to honor its implicit commitment to pay the bonus b after observing
performance y=1. If the worker believes the firm will not renege on the implicit contract, the
worker's effort decision from (2.2) is
(2.10)at(b)=
If salary is set at the minimum value satisfying (2.3), the firm's expected profitper period is
(2.11)V(b)ea*(b)_,a*(b)2.w5= ---we.
In a single-period employment relationship (or in the final period for a finite-lived
firm), the firm will choose not to pay a bonus, so the worker (anticipating the firm's
decision) will choose not to supply effort, so the firm (anticipating the worker's choice) does
not pay a salary, so the worker chooses not to work for the firm. To formalize the role of
trust in enforcing implicit contracts, we consider an infinitely repeated relationship.6 We
assume that the firm and the worker play trigger strategies: roughly speaking, the parties
begin by cooperating and then continue to cooperate unless one side defects, in which case
6Thediscount rate r can be reinterpreted so that the game is not infinitely repeated but instead concludes at
an uncertain date: suppose that after each period Is played a coin Is flipped, and that if heads occurs then the
game ends; lithe probabilityofheads Is q and the firm's actual discount rate is sthenr (s+q)/(l-q).10
they refuse to cooperate forever after.7 Such strategies have the virtue of being simple to
analyze but ignore two issues—optimal punishments and renegotiation, both of which are
beyond the scope of this paper.8
We solve for the trigger-strategy equilibrium that maximizes the finn's expected
wofit The key issue is how large a bonus the worker can trust the firm to pay. Our
assumption that the salary s is base pay and the bonus b is paid only if y =1makes a
difference here. The firm's temptation to stiff the worker would be larger if we had no base
paybutpaidabonusofswheny=Oandabonusofb+swheny=1. Ontheotherhand,
the firm's temptation to stiff the worker would be smaller if we had base pay of s ÷ (b/2) and
bonuses of -b/2 when y 0 and bt2 when y =1.In keeping with observed practice, we
assume that the bonus cannot be negative.9
If the worker's contribution is y 1, the farm must decide whether to pay the bonus
Ix The optimal choice depends on the firm's discount rate, r. Given the worker's strategy, if
the firm does not pay the bonus then its payoff is 1 -sthis period but zero thereafter,
whereas if the firm does pay the bonus then its payoff is 1-s- bthis period but equal to the
expected profit from the relationship thereafter. Thus, the firm should pay the bonus if and
More precisely, call the history of playcooperative ifthe firma has always offered the compensation
package (s, b) to be determined below, the worker has always chosen to work for the firm, and the firm has
always paid the bonus b when the worker's contribution was y 1. The worker's strategy is to work for the
firm provided that the history of play is cooperative (choosing alternative employment otherwise), and then to
choose the action a(b) to be determined below. Similarly, the firm's strategy is to offer the compensation
package Cs, b) provided that the histoay of play is cooperative (offering a =b =0otherwise), and to pay the
bonus b when the worker's contribution is y =1provided that the history of play is cooperative (paying zero
bonus otherwise).
On optimal punishments: Abreu (1988) shows that the highest equilibrium payoffs are supported by the
strongest credible punishments. In our analysis, the punishment for defecting (namely, playing the single-
period equilibrium forever after) is not the strongest credible punishment. We expect that the qualitative
properties of our results would continue to hold in an Abren-nyle analysis, because our results hinge on the
simple idea that greater cooperation is possible when the value of the ongoing relationship is larger.
On renegotiaciorn Several authors have argued that thegame that remains after one side defects is
identical to the game as a whole, so equilibria available at the beginning of thegame should also be available
after one side defects, so the players should renegotiate from the punishment wepropose to a new equilibrium
with higher payoffs for both players, thus wrecking our original trigger-strategy equilibrium. Other authors
have adopted different perspectives on renegotiation. (See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991. Chapter 5) for a
hterature review.) Because this litranjre is still in flux, and especially because the purelygame-theoretic
analyses of renegotiation abstract from institutions that would influence renegotiation in the labor market, we
do not adopt any of the existing approaches to renegotiation.
9
Allowing the bonus to be negative would complicate the analysis by creating a temptation forthe
workeno staff the firm, analogous to the firm's temptation we analyze. Itmay be that the costs of these
temptations are convex, so that it is more effective to tempt both sides slightly rather than one side greatly.
Ow analysisis correct if the firm faces an infinite sequence of workers, each of whom lives for one period (in
whichcase the worker has no reason to resist temptation), and is approximately correct if an infinitely lived
workers discount rate is very large. MacLend and 0989,1993) explore the range of outcomes
that can anse when the present value of the ongoing relationship is divided between theplayers so as to keep
both honest, and also how this division depends on whichplayer can more easily find a substitute for the
other.II
only if the present value of the expected profit beginning next period exceeds the size of the
bonus:
(2.12) ￿ b, or V(b) ￿ rb,
where 1k is the present value of $1 received next period andevezy period thereafter.
The optimal implicit contract sets b to maximize expected profitper period, V(b),
subject to the firm's reneging constraint (2.12). Rather than deriving the closed-form
solution to the firm's problem, it is more instructive to proceed graphically, as in Panel A of
Figure 2.1. The figure plots the firm's expected profit V(b) on the vertical axis and the
implicit-contract bonus b on the horizontal axis, and also shows the line rb for various
discount rates. For a given value of r, values of b where V(b) ￿ rb satisfy thereneging
constraint and therefore are feasible bonus payments in self-enforcing implicitcontracts.
Three features of V(b) are intuitive. First, as indicated by (2.11), V(b) is quadratic in b.
Second, at b =0,(2.10) implies that the worker will not exert effort, so the firm's expected
profit per period is -W5.Finally,ignoring the reneging constraint, expected profit per period
is maximized at bt =1,since a*(l) =l/2yisprecisely the first-best action, a*.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the two primary comparative-static results from this section: the
optimal bonus b* decreases as the discount rate or the worker's alternativewage increases;
ab
(2.13)-r<owcO.
Panel A shows that optimal subjective bonuses vary with the finn's discount rate. At
sufficiently low discount rates (for example, r =5%), thepresent value of the ongoing
relationship is high so the first-best contact b* =Iis feasible. For intermediate values (such
as r =7%),b =1is not feasible but other values of b satisfy the reneging constraint, so b* is
the largest of these feasible values (about .89, as shown in the figure); for such intermediate
values of r, the optimal bonus falls as r increases. Finally, for sufficiently high discount
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The optimal subjective piece rate declines with the worker's alternative wage.
Note:The dashed 1hes are the expected profit pe period, V(b)defined by (2.1 1). The figure assumes
Figure 2.1
Panel B of Figure 2.1shows that the optimal subjectivebonus depends on the
worker's alternativewage. As the alternative wage increases (from Wa = .02 to w8 = .03 in
the figure), the present value of the ongoingrelationshipfalls sothelargestfeasible (and
hence optimal) bonus declines.Asillustrated inthefigure, forsufficientlyhigh alternative
wages, no values of b satisfythereneging constraint, sonoimplicitcontractis feasible13
3.The Optimal Interplay between Implicit and Explicit Contracts
We can now begin the novel part of the analysis—combining an explicit contract
based on an objective performance measure with an implicit contact based on a subjective
performance assessment. We assume in Section 3A that the subjective performance
assessment is noncontractible but otherwise perfect; in Section 3B we extend the analysis to
imperfect subjective performance assessments. Both analyses proceed much as in Section
2C. The major new result (which holds for both perfect and imperfect subjective
assessments) is that the choice of an explicit contract now can affect the present value of the
ongoing relationship, and hence affect the design and performance of the optimal implicit
contract. We also derive several comparative static results.
3A.Perfect Subjective Performance Assessments
Atthe end of each period, the firm and worker observe the realization of the objective
performance measure, p. and the realization of the worker's contribution, y. If p =1the finn
pays the bonus (dictatedby the explicit contract, and if y =1the firm chooses whether to
pay the worker the bonus b specified in the implicit contract. In Section 2C, the firms
expected profit was V(b) per period if it honored the implicit contract, but zero in all future
periods if it reneged on the bonus, since we assumed that the worker would refuse to work
for the firm if it reneged. When both objective measures and subjective assessments are
available, however, there are new consequenóes of honoring or reneging on the implicit
portion of the contract. First, the expected profit per period from honoring the implicit
contract is not V(b) from (2.11) but rather V(b, )from(2.5).Second,when explicit
contracts are available, they are available both before and after the firm reneges, so in the
latter case it seems natural to assume that the worker would refuse to participate in any future
implicit contracts but would be willing to consider explicit contracts, and would accept an
explicit contract if it were sufficiently attractive.
In the absence of implicit contracts, the expected profit per period from the optimal
explicit contract is V@*) as defined in (2.9), which can be positive or negative depending on
the worker's alternative wage, wa, and the level of distortion in the objective performance
measure, var4t). As long as V(t) >0, implying that the opthnal explicit contract can both
attract the worker and make money for the firm, the relevant fallback position for a firm
reneging on an implicit contract is V(fi*). When this best feasible explicit contract yields
negative expected profit, V(P*) c 0, it is optimal for the firm to shut down rather than enter
into this contact, so the relevant faliback position is zero profit. The sign of V(fi*) has14
importantimplications for the optimal interplay between implicit and explicit contracts, so we
consider the two cases separately.
Case 1:V(fl>O
We first examine the case where the firm's faliback position is a profitable explicit
contact, V(.p*) >0. Given the payoffs from paying and from not paying the bonus b, the
firm should honor the implicit contract by paying the bonus if and only if the present value of
the difference in expected profit beginning next period exceeds the size of the bonus:
(3.1)V(b,D)V(B*)￿ b, or
Assuming that the reneging constraint (3.1) is satisfied, the worker's effort decision at(p., b,
D) is given by (2.2).
The optimal contract sets b and @10maximizeexpected profit V(b. J3), subject to the
reneging constraint (3.1). Defining), as the Lagrange multiplier for (3.1), and using (2.2);
(2.5), and (2.9), the first-order conditions for the optimal contract involving both subjective
assessments and objective measures (i.e., when b >0 and >0) are:
(3.2a) (1 +X)•(1 -b-p)=2xyr,
(3.2b)(1 +X>(l-b-E(g2})=0.
We denote the optimal bonuses as b** and ,todistinguish them from (and compare them
to) the optimal implicit contract bt in Section 2C and the explicit contact D* in Section 2B.
Equation (3.2b) yields the optimal 3 given an arbitrary value of b, which we denote
PS S
(3.3) D55(b) =(1-b)•l+J&@)(1-b)'.
That is, the optirnai when explicit and implicit contracts are combined is theoptimal 3 for an
explicit contract alone in the incentive problem of size (1 -b)that remains once an implicit
contract with bonus b is in effect. One intuitive implication of (3.3) is that if b55 is near one
thenisnear zero: if an implicit contract alone nearly achieves the first-best then there is
not much need for an explicit contact based on an imperfect performance measure.
For parameter values such that the first-best implicit contact b55=1 is not feasible,
the optimal b55 is deteitned by substituting **(b) into thereneging constraint (3.1).
Using equations (2.2), (2.5), and (2.9), the reneging constraint reduces to
(3.4) V[b, 355(b)] -V')=
b(24-b),1 ￿ rix15
Theoptimal implicit-contract bonus b** is then the largest value of b solving (3.4). Thus,
1 for47rc1') p
35b—2 41+var(g)r1'￿ Lvar4t)_\ () - r
var4x) 4 (j+var(j.t))yr2 l+vai))
0 for2Yr>l).
Equation (3.5)impliesthat implicit contracts cannot be used (b** =0)when the
discount rate is sufficiently high and/or the level of distortion in the objective performance
measure is sufficiently low. The intuition behind the former result is clear from Section 2C.
The intuition behind the latter is more interesting: if objective performance measures are
sufficiently close to perfect then the firm's failback position after reneging on an implicit
contract is too attractive—the firm will renege on any implicit contract. That is, even though
explicit contracts are not perfect, they can be sufficiently effective that they vitiate implicit
contracts, forcing the panics to transact in spot-market rather than long-term relationships. In
this sense, strong but imperfect performance in spot-market transactions actually hinders (in
fact, destroys) attempts to use implicit contracts as well.
Similarly, the first-best (b° =1)can be achieved at sufficiently low discount rates,
but the highest discount rate at which the first-best can be achieved declines as var(js) falls.
Even for a veiy low discount rate, the first-best cannot be achieved when the objective
performance measure is nearly perfect and so the failback contract itself is nearly first-best
For intermediate values of the optimal implicit-contract bonus (0<b**<1), the
optimal implicit-contract bonus increases as the objective performance measure becomes
more distortionary (varQ.t) increases), and (3.3) then implies that the optimal explicit-contract
bonus pdecreasesas var4z) increases. Likewise, as r falls b** rises, so r'falls.These
results confirm the intuition that implicit and explicit contacts can be substitutes.
One important difference between b** and b* (the optimal implicit contract in the
absence of explicit contracts, analyzed in Section 2C) is that b* depends on (and declines
with) the alternative wage Wa, while b** in (3.5)isindependent of wa. This difference
reflects differences in the failback position from reneging on the implicit contract. In Section
2C, in the absence of explicit contracts, the employment relationship ended if the firm
reneged on an implicit contract, so the finn had to meet the worker's alternative wage after
honoring an implicit contact but not after reneging. When VW*) > 0, however, the finn16
must meet the worker's alternative wage both after honoring the implicit contract and after
reneging on it, so the net cost of reneging in (3.1) is independent of the alternative wage.
To summarize, (3.5) and (3.3) yield the following six comparative-static results:
when VQ3*) >0 (and for parameters such that 0< b** c I),
___ ab*' .a3
=0,dvar(ji)> 0
a ** >0, =0 < 0•
Case 2: V(pi<O
We now examine the alternative case, in which the finn's fallback position after
reneging on an implicit contract is to shut down and earn zero profit thereafter. This shut-
down faliback occurs when the expected profit from the optimal explicit contact in the
absence of implicit contracts is negative, V($*) <0. We can also imagine circumstances in
which reneging on an implicit contact precludes the finn not only from entering into implicit
contracts in the future but also from entering into effective explicit contacts in the future.W
The results in this subsection apply whenever the relevant failback is to shut down.
When V(ft*)cO, the reneging constraint is not V(b, D)- V(fi*)￿ rb as in (3.1) but
rather V(b, )￿rb. Solving for the optimal contact proceeds as above; the only difference is
in the reneging constraint As shown in the Appendix, the first-order conditions(3.2a) and
(3.2b) continue to hold for this new problem, as does the expression for P**(b) in equation
(3.3). The reneging constraint can therefore be written as V[b, A**(b)J ￿ rb, from which it
is straightforward to derive the first five of the following sixcomparative-static results: when
V(J3*) cO (and for parameters such that 0< b** < 1),
ab**<0, <0,
(3.7) a*. a ap**
-3;—>.O.tj;;—> 0,
The derivations of these comparative-static resultsare relegated to the Appendix. Here we
compare these results to those from the first case, V(.p*) >0.
10 Although suchissues arc beyond the scope of our model, multi-period explicitconuactsin practice have
Important subjectivecomponen(such as implicit understandings not to 'ratchet" the piece rate or
performance target overtime) thatrequire employer-employee trust. Breakingimplicitcontacts in these
situations may affect the etfectjyen or eventhefeasibility of future explicit contracts it may be impossible forthe firm to fall back to V($'); the relevant alternativemay be to shut down.17
Recallthat whenV(*) >0,an increase in thediscountrate reduces the largest feasible
implicit-contract bonus, and (3.3) then implies that the optimal explicit-contract bonus
increases. These two results reappear when the relevant failback position is to shut down.
Similarly, recall from Section 2C (i.e., in the absence of explicit contracts) that an increase in
the alternative wage Wareducesthe present valueof the ongoing employment relationship, so
the implicit-contract bonus falls. This result also reappears when the relevant failback
position is to shut down, and here, in the presence of explicit contracts, (3.3) again implies
that the explicit-contract bonus increases.
The most interesting comparative-static results in (3.7) involve changes in var(,u), the
level of distortion of the objective performance measure. Recall that when V(p')>O,
decreasing the distortion in the objective performance measure increases the explicit bonus
and decreases the implicit bonus—implicit and explicit contracts are substitutes. When V(*)
c 0, however •theimplicit bonus b** increases as the objective performance measure
becomes less distortionary, while the effect on the explicit bonusisambiguous. The
intuition behind these results is as follows.
Suppose that the worker and firm are currently engaged in the optimal implicit
contact in the absence of explicit contractsb*, as derived in Section 2C—earning expected
profit V(b*)>0. Suppose further that the discount rate is sufficiently high that this implicit
contract is second best (b* c 1), so that the reneging constraint (2.12) is binding:
V(b*) =rb*.Now consider the introduction of an imperfect objective performance measure,
but suppose that p is sufficiently distortionary that it could not support a profitable explicit
contract in the absence of implicit contracts—that is, V(p*) cO. Even though p is not
profitable on its own, setting a low piece rate can improve expected profit, holding b
constant: V(b', )> V(b)for small values Of p.Thisincrease in the present value of the
ongoing employment relationship implies that the reneging constraint is no longer binding,
V(b*, P)> rb*,which in turn implies that the implicit bonus b** can be increased from its
optimal value in the absence of explicit contracts, b** >b.Thus, the objective performance
measure enhances the effectiveness of subjective performance assessment by increasing the
value of the ongoing relationship between the firm and the worker, thereby decreasing the
firm's incentive to renege on an implicit contract and so increasing the reliance on subjective
assessments.
The result that introducingobjectiveperformance measures increases the value of the
ongoing relationship, thereby allowing the increased the use of implicit contracts, also holds
for improvements in existing objective measures: as long as V(ft*) remains negative,
decreases in var(p) improve the value of the relationship and so cause the optimal bonus b**
to increase. Equation (3.3) suggests why the effect of changes in var(g) on is18
ambiguous: both b** and l/(l+var(p)) increase when var4t) declines, so the net implication
for D**isunclear. It is not difficult to construct examples in which fr'isnon-monotone in
varQs).
Figure 3.1 illustrates how implicit and explicit contacts vary with the level of
distortion in the objective performance measure. The figure assumes a discount rate r=8%
an alternative wage wa =.02,and an effort-disutility parametery =3. The top panel of the
figure shows the optimal explicit contract in the absence of implicit contracts (j5 from Section
2B) and the optimal implicit contract in the absence of explicit contracts (b* from Section
2C). Naturally, variations in var4t) have no effect on the optimal implicit contract b*. As
varQt) approaches zero, rapproachesone, since then p is identical to y and the optimal
explicit contract can achieve the first-best. At sufficiently high distortions (i.e.,
var4t)> 19/6, given the other parameter assumptions), the best explicit contact in the
absence of implicit contracts is unprofitable, V(p*) <0.
The bottom panel of Figure 3.1 considers optimal implicit and explicit contracts when
the two are used together (b** and J3**). For sufficiently small var4t), no implicit contract is
feasible because the firm's failback position is too attractive, so the optimal contract is simply
the explicit contract fr'c The optimal implicit-contract bonus b becomes positive once the
distortion in the objective performance measure makes the firm's fallback position
sufficiently unattractive: V(b, **(b)] -Vth*)> rb for small values of b. Equation (3.5)
shows that b*l > 0 when var4t) > 2yr/(1-2yr) (or var(p.>12/13, given the assumed
parameters). This critical value of varQ.t) is denoted by V(b, p**)..V(p).b** in the
figure. Increases in the distortion of p past this critical value result in increases in b** and
further decreases in **,bothbecause higher implicit bonuses can be supported as the
fallback position becomes less attractive, and becausep becomes less useful as a performance
measure.
A second critical value of var4t) is denoted VW*) =0,as defined in the top panel.
For all values of var4j) above (and for some values below) this second critical value, the
optimal implicit bonus b** exceeds the bonus b* from the optimal implicit contract in the
absence of explicit contracts, because the use of p>0enhances the value of the ongoing














Note: bis the bonus for an implicit contractin the absence ofanyexplicitcontract1B isthe
bonusfor an explicit contract if no implicitcontractis used, and b and *" are the implicit and
explicit bonuses when the two contracts are used in combination. The figure assumes Wa= .02,
and y=3.
Figure3.1
Figure 3.2 provides a more striking illuswadon of the extent to which implicit and
explicit contracts can reinforce each other. As Figure 2.1 illustrated, for sufficiently high
values of r or Wa, no implicit contract is feasible on its own—no value of b generates enough
profit to stop the firm from reneging. Likewise, if the variance of x is sufficiently largethen



























however, then it may be that implicit and explicit conwacts can operate in combination even
though neither is feasible alone.
The parameters underlying Figure 3.2 are the same as assumed in Figure 3.1, except
that the discount rate has been increased to 9%—sufficiently high that no implicit conwact is
feasible on its own. (Mote that the scale of the figure differs from Figure 3.1.) As before,
Wa =.02and y =3,so no explicit contract is feasible on its own when var4t)￿ 19/6.
Nonetheless, for a substantial range of values of var4t) above 19/6, implicit and explicit
conncts are feasible if (but only if) used in combination.
3B. imperfect Subjective Pe,formance Assessments
In Sections 2C and 3A we assumed that the firm and the worker both were able to
observe a perfect measure of the worker's contribution to finn value (y) that could be the
basis of an implicit contract, but not an explicit one. In this subsection, we relax this
assumption: we assume that one or both of the parties cannot observe y, so implicit contracts
like those in Sections 2C and 3A are not possible. We also assume, however, that both
parties can observe a new subjective performance measure, q, that is an imperfect proxy for y
in the same way that p is (as explained below). In this section, we sketch our model and
describe the primary results and intuition behind our analysis. The formai derivations of
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Note: Tbcfigureassumesw .02,r=9%,t3. Inthiscase.noimplicitcontzactisfeasibleonitsown,sob is
not defined, If varOi)>10.3, implicitcontracts are infeasible even in combination with the optimal explicit
contract, sob" is undefined.21
Weinterpret q as representing performance evaluation by immediate supervisors.
The imperfections in q as a proxy for y could reflect the supervisor's inabilityor bias in
assessing local aspects of the subordinate's performance; alternatively, local performance
could be assessed perfectly but firm-wide performance imperfectly. The workermay be able
to exploit suspected biases in the supervisor's evaluation technology, by focusing on actions
that are perceived favorably by the supervisor regardless of their effects on the value of the
organization. This possibility suggests the value of performance evaluation by multiple
supervisor, which we discuss in Section 6.
Formally, we assume that q equals either zero or one, and that q=l with probability
ta, whereeisastrictly positive random variable with E(t)=l. Similar to our assumptions
on .1,weassume that: the support oft and the value ofy are suchthatc•a cl;£ andRare
independent; and given t,j.t, anda, the events that q =1, p =1,and y =1 areindependent. A
worker paid on the basis of the subjective and objective performance measuresq and p
observes £andx (neither of which is observed by the firm) and then chooses an action.
Thus, the only qualitative difference between q and p is that the former is subjective and so
cannot be the basis of an explicit contract.
The primary results from Section 3A continue to hold for imperfect subjective
performance measures. In particular, explicit contracts can enhance the performance of
imperfect implicit contracts by increasing the value of the ongoing relationship between the
firm and the worker, and thereby decreasing the finn's incentive torenege on an implicit
contract. To emphasize that the subjective performance measure is q rather than y, we will
write B rather than b for the bonus paid in the implicit contract In this notation, the above
result can be stated as B** >B's.
In addition to reinvestigating the results derived in Section 3A, we also analyzed the
effects of increasing the distortion associated with the subjective assessment (modeled as
increases in the variance of e). Not surprisingly, as the subjective measure becomes
increasingly distortionary, the optimal size of the implicit-contract bonus (B"') decreases and
the optimal size the explicit-contract bonus (p**)increases:
dB** d$**￿O.
dvar(c) dvar(c)
Simply put, as the accuracy of the implicit performance measure goes down, less use will be
made of implicit contracts, and more use will be made of explicit ones.22
4. Subjective Weights on Objective Performance Measures
• The explicit contracts analyzed in Sections 2C and 3 induced the worker's effort
supply to be an increasing function of g, but the first-best action (a* =112?)is independent
of g. For the optimal explicit contract in the absence of implicit contacts, r= 1/(1+var(g))
from (2.8), for example, the worker will work harder than socially optimal when Li> (1 +
varQ4),and will work less hard than socially optimal when Li c (1 +var(J1)). Theworker
"games" the compensation system by taking actions that achieve higher bonuses, even when
these actions do not maximize the value of the firm.
In this section, we assume that thà employer or a supervisor can subjectively assess
the incentive distortions caused by the imperfect objective performance measure. In
particular, we assume not only that the worker observes tbeforechoosing an action (as
before) but now also that the firm observes L after p is realized. If the employer's
observation of x were contractible then the first-best could be achieved by setting a Li-
contingent piece rate of j54s) =1/p.This explicit conuact would equate the expected marginal
products of the worker's action on y and p for all values of p., thus eliminating all incentive
distortions. We assume, however, that Li is noncontractible (or "subjective," in the sense in
which we applied the term to the performance assessments y and q).
When the employer's observation of Li is noncontactible, it can be used only as part
of an implicit contract enforced through the finn's reputation concerns. In our analysis of
such subjective weights on objective performance measures (or "subjective piece rates," for
short), we assume as before that the worker receives a base salary, s, and a bonus for
achieving p=l. The total bonus is +b(p.),including both a non-negative objective
component, p￿o,anda non-negative subjective component, b(Li) ￿ 0. Since iis
noncontractible, pcannotbe contingent on p., but the implicit-contract bonus b41) can vary
with IL
Inorder to focus on subjective weights on objective measures, in this section we
ignore subjective weights on subjective measures—that is, we ignore implicit contracts based
on y or q, as were analyzed earlier. If the worker believes that the firm will honor the
implicit contract bQ.i), the worker's problem (after observing Li) is therefore
(4.1)
sothe worker's optimal action is23
(4.2) a*[j.t, ,b4t)]=
Asin our earlier analyses of implicit contracts based ony, the first-best can be
achieved here if the discount rate is sufficiently low. To achieve the first-bestthe finn must
pay a total bonus of
(4.3)
foreach possible value of g. If the firm honors this implicit contract(by paying the
subjective piece rate b(s) on the objective performance measure p), it will receive the first-
best profit thereafter—namely, Vf!) =I/(4y)-w3. Ifthe firm reneges it will thereafter receive
the profit from the optimal explicit contract—namely, V(p*) =1/4y(1.t-varQx)) -Wafrom
(2.9). The firm thus will honor the first-best contract defined by (4.3) if and only if the
present value of the difference in expected profit beginning next period exceeds the size of the
bonus:




As (4.5)shows,the firm is most tempted to renege after observing low realizations ofpt,
since these realizations require high subjectively determined bonuses. A sufficient condition
for achieving the first-best is for (4.5) to hold at =0for the lowest possible g, which we
denote by gL > 0. If this sufficient condition fails, the firmmay still be able to achieve the
first-best by combining implicit and explicit contracts, as follows.
Denoting the highest value of s by p.LH, the highest possible Dconsistentwith the first-
best is =l/pL,since any higher objective piece rate would require a negative subjective
piece rate over some range of pi (which in turn might induce workers to renege on the implicit
contract, as discussed in footnote 9). We will call n,=l/gH the first-best objective piece rate.
To achieve the first-best, the subjective piece rate, b4Q, must be bffi4t) =l4t-3p, sothat
total incentives are+bpjj.t) =l4xfor each p.: the subjective piece rate completely
eliminates or "backs out" the distortions that would be inherent inany objective piece-rate
contract. This combination of implicit and explicit concracts—bmQs) and fb—is illustrated
by the bold curve in Figure 4.1.
Although this first-best contract is feasible at sufficiently low discount rates, it is not
feasible when discount rates are too high, because the firm finds it worthwhile torenege on24
the largest subjectively determined bonuses (which are associated with the smallest values of
it). If we (temporarily) fix the objective piece rate at its first-best level, m1IPm then we
can define I.LL* > I1L as the lowest value of p. that satisfies (4.5). That is, I.LL* solves
(4.6)—-1(varQx) '1+fb.
J.LL*r4y(l+var4t))
One feasible contract is to set the objective piece rate atand the subjective piece rate at
bUt) =l/ji-for x ￿ p.* and b(p.) =l/p.*-for g < I.LL*. (This contract is
depicted in Figure 4.1 as the bold first-best contract for L ￿ IL and the bold dashed line at
l4tL* for pi c p.L*.) This feasible contract will provide first-best incentives for p. ￿ I.tL, but









Figureshows the first-best combination of explicit and implicit weights on the objective
performance measure (bold curve). as well as the maximum feasible total incentives associated
with first-best explicit incentives (bold dashed line). Sec text for definition of variables.
Figure 4.1
The envelope theorem implies that this feasible contract can be improved by setting
the objective piece rate above its first-best value. Consider the effects of a small increase in
the explicit piece rate to some > np,.First,total incentives for the highest levels of p. will be
too high, leading to departures from first-best actions. Since np.,providedfirst-best
incentives for these highest values of p., however, this change is second-other. The second
effect of increasing pisto increase total incentives for all values of p. less than IIL* (so far
holding b(g) fixed specified above). Since total incentives were below the first-best level for25
all z< LL*,thisincrease in total incentives is a first-order effect Indeed, this first-ordergain
will increase expected profits and so allow thefinntoincreaseb for lowvalues of p.,further
increasing the total incentives in this region.
By the preceding argument, the second-best contract (illustrated in Figure 4.2)sets
Psb >providing too much incentive for high realizations of p., and too little incentive for
low values of p.. The second-best contract will involve two critical values ofp., denoted by
p.L" and MHSb,wherep. <ggsb <p.11.For values of p. .c p.yb, the firm will suffer
inadequate incentives but will not renege on its implicit connct for values ofx >JtHsb, the
finn will suffer excessive incentives, because sb=l41I{Sb> lb. Thesubjective weight on the
performance measure is given by:
10 forp.￿g5b,
(4.7) bsbO.L)=j lAIL PcbforkLsb<p. <g11sb,
Psbforp.￿ I.tLSt.
Inthis analysis of subjective weights on objectiveperformancemeasures, subjective
weightsallow the employer to mitigate known or suspected distortions in the performance
measurement process. To do so, the contract between the worker and the firm is left
deliberately vague: although there is an explicit understanding of how performance is
measured, there is only an implicit understanding regarding how that performance measure is
rewarded. There is an important role for objective weights in thiscontract, because
increasing the objective piece rate reduces the finn's temptation to renege on the subjective
portion. Objective weights that do not distort incentives will always be preferred to
subjective weights; the envelope theorem implies that the firm will accept some degree of





Figureshows thesecond-best combination ofexplicit and implicit weights on the. objective
performance measure (in bold). See text fix definition of variables.
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5. Implications,Discussion and Evidence
Wenextexplore theimplications of the models developed in Sections 3 and 4, and
showhow certain aspects of compensationsystems used inorganizations canbe understood
asoptimalcontracts consistent with our results. We discuss three particular implications of
our model: that effective explicit incentive contracts may increase the use of implicit contracts,
that a decline in the profitability of a finn will reduce the use of implicit contracts and increase
the use of explicit ones, and that a reduction in the accuracy of subjective performance
measures will also reduce the use of implicit and increase the use of explicit contracts. We
also highlight examples where the weights attached to objective performance measures are
subjective rather than objective.
The Effect of Objective Performance Measures on the Use of Implicit Contracts
The results presented in Section 3 suggest that, rather than acting strictly as
substitutes in the provision of incentives, objective and subjective performance assessment
systems may reinforce one another. We present two such situations, and discuss how our
model helps explain each.27
As discussedin theIntroduction, Lincoln Electric Company uses large amounts of
bothobjective and subjective performanceassessmentinits incentive plan.tt Workersare
well-paidandproductive: compensationatLincoln Electric is abouttwicetheavenge for
manufacturing employees, and productivity is more than twice the industry average. There is
no base salary. Workers receive about half their pay from a piece rate based strictly on the
quantity of items produced)2 The rest of a worker's compensation comes in the form of a
year-endbonus,which is distributed to employees based on a purely subjective merit rating
made bytheemployee's supervisor.Thesubjectiveratingsare based on such factors as
dependability, quality, output,and"ideas and cooperation."3
That Lincoln Electric usessuch alarge amountofsubjectivelydeterminedbonus in
combination with the objectively determined piece rate is consistent with ow models.
Indeed, our model in Section 3 suggests that the objective incentive contract helps the finn
sustain such a rich subjective bonus plan. The year-end bonus payments represent half of the
pre-tax, pre-bonus profits of the company, or approximately twice net income after taxes.
The firm has a strong incentive to renege on its promise to pay these bonuses, but the fact
that the workers are so productive (due in part to the success of the piece-rate system) makes
the ongoing relationship very valuable and so makes the implicit contract self-enforcing.
Workers understand this, and agree to a contract with a large.subjective bonus component.
The president of Lincoln Electric, George Willis, also understands the importance of implicit
contracts and trust at the company he said in 1975 that "If our employees did not believe that
management was trustworthy, honest, and impartial, the system would not operate."
Lincoln Electric's bonus plan also illustrates the use of subjective weights on
objective performance measures. Notice that the quantity of output is a criterion for the
subjective bonus. This objectively measured factor, although rewarded by the explicit piece-
rate contract, is given additional weight through the subjective bonus plan. Our model in
Section 4 provides a rationale for such a combination of contracts: the subjective weights
allow the firm to "back out" unintended dysfunctional behavior induced by the piece-rate
incentives. The firm can use its subjective observations of the conditions actually faced by
the workers to adjust the total incentives provided for quantity.
The material in this subsection comes from Berg (1975). Baldwin (1982), and Perry (1988).
12 In aj(jidon work sciI th& names oneverything th they prneIj QSity problems, whether
discovered by inspectorscustomers, axe corrected by the workers on their own time.
13 Interestingly, Lincoln relies on another kind ofimplicit contract in administering its piece-rate contracts.
To avoid the ratchet effect that can plague piece-rate systems (Roy, 1952; Gibbons, 1987), the finn's stated
policy is that changes in the piece price will occur only after important technological innovations. As with
an implicit incentive contract, this rate-changing policy is vulnerable to reneging by die finn. Lincoln again
solves this problem by staking its reputation.28
Asecond Organizational context, the leveraged buyoutof0. M. Scott, also illustrates
the interaction of subjective and objective bonus plans.'4 0. M. Scott had been a division of
liT, a multi-national conglomerate. Under ITF, the company had a modest bonus program
that provided small payments with almost no time-series variation in rewards. Following the
LBO, the new majority-owner (investment banker Clayton & Dubilier) introduced a
redesigned compensation system that substantially increased the variation in time-series
payoffs and changed the way performance was measured.
As at Lincoln Electric, the post-LBO 0. M. Scott uses a combination of subjective
and objective measures of perfonnance. Bonuses for the top managers of the firm are
determined by a formula that places a 50% weight on the attainment of corporate goals, and
50% weight on the attainment of individual-specific personal goals.15 Corporate
performance goals are based on quantitative cash-flow-based measures such as earnings
before interest and taxes (EBrF) and avenge working capital (AWC). The personal goals—
negotiated annually between the manager and his or her superior—include accomplishment of
specific tasks and perfOrming particular activities. The attainment of personal goals is
assessed by the manager's superior.
The increased reliance on subjective perfonnance measures in the 0. M. Scott bonus
plan following the LEO is consistent with the intuition provided in Section 3. The financing
of the LEO imposed new financial obligations on the company to pay out substantial cash
flow over a ten-year period. These obligations gave the firm a new and better-defined set of
corporate goals—to generate cat from operations and to make efficient use of its working
capital—that lend themselves well to explicit incentive contracts based on EDIT and AWC.
Such a change could be modeled as decreasing var(j.t), the distortion in the objective
performance measure. According to the comparative-static results in Section 3, such a
change can increasetheuse of subjective measures because the increased profits resulting
from superior objective performance measurement permit stronger incentives through implicit
contracts. At 0. M. Scott, as the relative efficiency of the cash-flow-based objective
measures increased the value of the relationship between the company and the managers,
Clayton & Dubjijer was able to increase the use of a subjective performance evaluation
system.
14ThisdatadrawnfromBkandwp.rj(l989)
Division management receivedbonuses based 40%ondivisional financial performance, 35% on
corporate performance,and 25% on attainment ofindividual goals.29
TheDeclineof Trust at IBM
Recent events at IBM also are consistent with the models presented in Section 3. In
particular, the company's aggressive early retirement programs, its abandonment of its
lifetime employment policy, and its reorganization (and even spinning off) of its business
units can all be seen as responses to the firm's and the employees' recognition that the finn
will not be as profitable in the future.16 This decline in the value of future cooperative
relationships between finn and worker leads to increased difficulty in maintaining implicit
incentive con tracts.
IBM's recent "voluntary" early retirement programs began in response to several
years of declining profitability, as well as recognition by top management that the future
prospects for its mainframe computer business were not good. Press accounts describe
several aspects of the program that suggest that early retirements were not necessarily
voluntary. Supervisors were encouraged to suggest the program to certain managers, and
managers who received such suggestions speculated that if they did not accept the offer
quickly, a less generous future severance offer could be the result. The firm was also
reported to be using several techniques to cut employment while avoiding formal lay-offs,
including moving unproductive employees from staff to line positions, where their poor
performance could be documented and they could be terminated "for causC
The fact that IBM tried so hard to appear to honor its lifetime-employment implicit
contract, but that this attempt was met with such skepticism by employees, indicate both top
management's perception of the value of this contract and employees' (and ultimately top
management's) recognition that the company would no longer honor it. One response to this
loss of trust in the implicit contracts at IBM has been a wholesale reorganization of the finn's
business units, including a major change in how the company measures performance.
According to an article in the internal IBM magazine, the company has begun to report
"performance data—revenue, profit, cash, returns, etc.—[thatj will constitute the set of
criteria against which each business will be measured" (Iwata, 1992). According to Lohr
(1992), "Everyone is a ..profitcenter, selling to each other and to outsiders. That
mentality is nurtured by constantly measuring performance and customer satisfaction, and
rewarding the teams who do the best" These newly independent units rely much less on the
implicit contracts backed by the reputation of IBM as a whole, and instead use explicit
incentive contracts and objectively determined bonuses. The models presented in Section 3
predict just such a response to the declining future profitability of the finn.
16 The information in this subsection is drawn from McGee (1991), Schrage (1986), Lohr (1992), Iwata
(1992), and Hooper(1993).30
Subjective perfonnance assessmem at Bennett, Strang and Farris
Our model predicts that as subjective performance measures become less accurate,
firms will tend to decrease reliance on implicit-contract bonus plans, and will insteaduse
more objectively determined bonuses. Such a decline in the accuracy of subjective measures
seems inevitable as finns grow and increase in complexity. David Maister, an expert on
professional partnerships, describes typical problems related S partner performance
evaluation and compensation in a composite law finn he called Bennett, Strang, and Farris
(3SF).17
Maister's case describes the evolution of BSF. When the firm was small, the actively
involved founders could closely monitor partner performance and make careful and informed
subjective evaluations of each partner's contribution to the value of the firm. Annual profits
were divided among partners solely at the discretion of the firm's three founders and named
partners. There was no need for a formal appeals process for compensation-related
complaints since the top partners were generally able to convince unhappy individuals, that
they had taken reasoned judgments.
Over the following decades, the finn grew in profitability and size by expanding into
a full-service law firm, offering legal services in a wide range of practice areas.
Compensation decisions, once made by the long-since-retired founding partners, rested with
a democratically elected seven-member compensation committee. Increasing dissatisfaction
with the subjective nature of the evaluation process led the firm to adopt formalguidelines to
assess performance, based on objective data such as partner age and seniority, billable hours,
fees collected, time spent on other partners' clients, origination credits, bill collectionrates,
and so on. Without explicitly placing weights on thesemeasures, the committee used these
data to allocate the partnership profit pool. Consistent with our analysis ofsubjective
weights on objective performance measures (in Section 4), the committee was concerned that
specifying explicit weights would lead the partners to focus on the bonus formula rather than
firm profitability.
By the end of Maister's case, the compensation system at his composite law finn was
coming under increasing fire from partners for not being "objective" enough. Partners were
concerned that they compensation committee lacked sufficient information to make
appropriate subjective assessments. The announcement of the compensation committee's
Formerly a professor at Harvard Business School, Maister founded and flow heads a firm that consults to
professional partnerships. We refer to his case, "Bennett, Strang and Farris."31
recommendations prompted a disputatious partners' meeting, and a call for a thorough review
of the compensation system.
Analysis of this case in light of the model presented in Section 3 suggests that a major
factor contributing to the changes and controversy surrounding compensation at 8SF was the
growth in firm size and complexity. This increased the difficulty for any one person (or
small group) to assess the incremental contribution of a partner to the value of the entire firm.
Subjective evaluations by the compensation committee were thus more likely to be viewed as
inaccurate, and so more likely to lead to distorted incentives for the partners. If we model
growth in size and complexity as increases in the variance of the distortion in the subjective
performance measure, var(e), the law firm's move towards heavier reliance on objective
measures is consistent with our comparative-static prediction in Section 3W
6.SummaryandExtensions
Thispaper is a first step in the analysis of subjective performance assessment. The
paper brings formal analysis to questions about incentive contracts that have been only
informally treated in the past. Specifically, we model trust in subjective compensation
contracts, using the requirement that such contracts be self-enforcing. We feel that, like
Kreps' (1990) game-theoretic analysis of corporate culture, the paper shows promise for the
use of formal techniques in the analysis of topics previously considered "too soft" for such
work. The effectiveness of incentive contracting in organizations depends on a large set of
social, psychological, and economic factors, only a few of which have been explored by
economists. We hope we have expanded this set a little.
There are many aspects of the problem we have not yet addressed. In Section 38, for
example, we suggested that the worker's private information c that affects the imperfect
subjective performance assessment q may be a first step towards modeling supervisor bias.
It would be natural to extend the model to explore the use of multiple evaluators in subjective
performance assessment systems. Suppose that the th supervisor's sñbjective evaluation
involves a distortion tj, and that workers "game" the performance-appraisal process by
taking actions that are perceived favorably by a particular supervisor, If the distortions are
independently distributed across supervisors, the gaming can be mitigated by combining the
subjective performance evaluations of several supervisors.'8
As an example, most promotion and tenure decisions at universities are made by
committees of senior faculty members. Although objective performance measures such as
Prendergast and Topel (1992) make a similar suggestion.32
number of publicaflons or teaching-evaluation ratings are used in the process, the ultimate
decision is generally based on a highly subjective evaluation of the candidate's expected
contribution to the value of the university. Individually, each committee member may have
idiosyncratic biases or predispositions such as emphasizing teaching over research, or
research over teaching, or collegiallty. or viewing specific types of research as particularly
favorable. A candidate evaluated by a single senior faculty member could focus on activities
viewed favorably by that particular senior colleague, independent of the effect of these
activities on the value of the organization. Basing decisions on the evaluations of several
senior colleagues, each with their own set of biases and predispositions, is much harder to
game in a similar fashion.19
The supervisorial biases discussed so far reflect ways in which supervisors
misinterpret performance data, but do not reflect explicit favoritism on the part of the
evaluator. One way to begin to model such favoritism would be to allow the supervisor to
observe q privately (rather than publicly with the worker, as in Section 3B), and then to
analyze the supervisor's incentive to report q truthfully. This potential exercise of managerial
discretion over truthfully reporting the performance measure suggests another role for trust in
the performance-evaluation process: workers don't trust subjective performance evaluation
when they feel that supervisors indulge in favoritism.
Finally, although it departs from our focus on pay for performance, a further
extension of our approach merits attention. Perhaps the most pervasive performance-based
implicit contract in most organizations pertains to promotions. Just as we have analyzed the
interplay between implicit and explicit pay-for-performance contracts, one could also
combine implicit promotion contracts with explicit pay-for-performance contracts.
In the present paper, a one-shot implicit contract creates no incentives (because the
firm will renege on any promised bonus payment), but implicit contracts in ongoing
relationships can create incentives (as analyzed in Section 2C). When these repeated-game
incentives are inefficiently low (perhaps because the discount rate or alternative wage is too
high), there is scope for imperfect explicit contracts, both to provide additional incentives and
(more interestingly) to increase the value of the relationship, thereby allowing stronger
implicit-contract incentives.
In an analogous paper on promotions, even a one-shot implicit contract could create
some incentives. Waldman (1984), Kahn and Huberman (1988), and Prendergast (1993),
for example, consider two-period models in which the finn's promotion decision is made on
19 In addition,keeping the identities of the evaluators confidential during the promotion and tenure
process—effectively hiding infonnation about e front the promotion candidate—is another way to mitigate
gaming.33
asubjectivebasis—that is the promotioncontract is implicit—but the firm chooses to
promote some workers anyway because of the resulting second-period profit: workers with
sufficientlyvaluable ability ortraining are worth promoting to a higher-paying job. In these
models, thefinn's job assignmentsand the worker's investment in training are generally not
first-best. In repeated-game versions of these promotion models (in which the firm lives
forever and workers arrive in overlapping two-period generations), the firm's decisionto
promote a worker would be based on profits from both the current and future workers, so
job assignments and investment decisions would typically be more efficient than in the one-
shot case. As in the present paper, however, these job assignments and investment decisions
could still be somewhat inefficient, again creating scope for imperfect explicit pay-for-
performance contracts.34
Appendix
Comparative Statics for Case 2: V(13)cO
This Appendix solves for the optimal b** and ** for the case when the explicit
contract in the absence of implicit performance measures is unprofitable, V(*) cO. and
derives the comparative statics results reported in equation (3.7). When V(D*)cO, the
reneging constraint is not V(b, )-V(*)￿ rb as in (3.1) but rather V(b, D)￿rb, where
(using (2.2), (2.5), and (2.9))
(A.1)V(b, )2Epia*4L, b, )- )U'(J.I,b, D)2- Wa)),
=
Theoptimal contract sets b and ptomaximize expected profit V(b, ),subjectto the reneging
constraint V(b, p)￿rb. Defining ) as the Lagrange multiplier for this constraint, the first-
order conditions for the optimal contract involving both subjective assessments and objective
measures (i.e.,whenb >0 and >0) are:
(A.2a)(1 +X)•fl -b-)=2Xyr,
(A.2b)(1 ÷ X)(1 -b-p(l+varQLJ))=0,
The first-order conditions (A.2a) and (A.2b) are identical to (3.2a) and (3.2b) for the
case VW4) >0. Equation (A.2b) yields p**(b), the optimal pgivenan arbitraiy value of b.
(A.3) D**(b) =(1-b)
For parameter values such that the first-best implicit contract bt =1is not feasible,
the optimal implicit-contract bonus b** is the largest value of b solving
(A.4) VEb, p**(b)1 =!— (4)2k+ 2bk + 14) -Wa = rb,
where k =var@)/[l+ var(g)J c 1. Equation (A.4) is a quadratic of the form Ab2 + Bb + C
=O,whereA=-k,B=2k-4r,andC= 1 -k-4,wa. 1f82+4kC>Othen thereexi.scsan
interval of values of b satisfying the constraint. The solution is the largest value of b in [0, 1]
that satisfies the constraint
(A4)b**_B+'4B2+4kC —
2k35
Sinceb** decreases with k, the largest value of b satisfying (A 1.3) exceeds that satisfying
(A1.4): b**> b. Since C decreases with w8,thefact that abis/ac< 0implies that bt
decreases with Wa. Similarly1 b** increases with B and thus decreases with r. Also, as
vaxG.i) increases, k increases (approaching unity), so b** decreases. To summarize,
ab ______ r<°
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